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Deborah A. Chassmant and Howard Rolstont
In an article entitled The Managdment Side of Due Process,
Professor Jerry L. Mashaw argues that the procedural safeguards
typically associated with due process in trial suits are insufficient
to ensure fairness in the adjudication of social welfare claims. So-
cial welfare programs, he contends, involve purposes, methods,
and clientele that seriously compromise traditional elements of
due process, such as the right to notice of adverse claims, the
right to present testimony, and the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses. Arguing that additional safeguards are necessary,
Mashaw concludes that managers of the social welfare adjudica-
tion process could enhance procedural fairness by establishing
quality control systems.
According to Mashaw, these inadequacies arise from the
basic, widespread assumption that traditional procedural
safeguards are "self-correcting mechanisms" that ensure "accurate
findings of facts and the authoritative application of law to
fact."' 2  Consequently, the traditional "attributes of trial-type pro-
cedure ... have come to define due process," and as a result
"[claims of unfairness are made in terms of the denial of one or
* Although much of this Article derives from the authors' experience in developing
and operating a quality assurance system at the Office of Hearings and Appeals of the
Social Security Administration, they have no current connection with any such operation.
Thus, the information contained herein should not be taken to be representative of any
quality assurance system which may currently be operating in OHA, and their opinions
and judgments should in no way be taken as indicative of any Social Security Administra-
tion opinions or judgments. No official support or endorsement by the Office of Hearings
and Appeals of the Social Security Administration is intended or should be inferred.
The authors express their thanks to Profegsor Jerry Mashaw of Yale University and
Professors Roy Shotland and Warren Schwartz of Georgetown University for their encour-
agemeot and their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
t B.A. University of Chicago, 1958; M.A. C.U.N.Y., 1971.
* B.A. University of California, 1962; M.A. University of Michigan, 1963; Ph.D. Har-
vard University, 1971.
1 Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on
the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
2 Id. at 775.
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more of the[se] attributes." 3  Mashaw challenges the underlying
assumption with evidence suggesting that these traditional ele-
ments of due process do not tend to assure accuracy of results in
the social welfare setting. From this he concludes that "[d]ue
process in the social welfare context ... requires redefinition to
include management processes which will tend to assure the accu-
racy of claims adjudications." 4
Mashaw does not view such management efforts as a re-
placement for traditional safeguards, but rather as a necessary
supplement to them .5  Mashaw bases his reasoning on three as-
sertions. First, traditional methods of assuring due process are in-
adequate in the social welfare context. Second, appropriately
applied quality control systems can repair this inadequacy, en-
hancing the "fundamental fairness" of adjudication by increasing
its tendency to produce accurate results. Third, quality control
systems can, in fact, be successfully applied in the social welfare
adjudication setting.
This Article will evaluate the two latter assertions. Although the
discussion will not decisively resolve the correctness of Professor
Mashaw's position, it does provide evidence pertinent to such a
resolution. Specifically, it will show that although theoretical and
practical problems arise in the application of quality control sys-
tems to certain forms of social welfare adjudication, such prob-
lems are surmountable. Furthermore, current data on the applica-
tion of quality assurance to social welfare adjudication strongly
suggest that such procedures can improve the accuracy of these
adjudications.
Evidence supporting these conclusions derives from the au-
thors' experience in designing, implementing, and operating a
quality assurance system at the Office of Hearings and Appeals
(OHA) within the Social Security Administration (SSA). OHA is
responsible for conducting hearings and issuing decisions on
claims for Social Security benefits which the agency has denied at
lower levels. 6 The OHA hearing process is relevant to Mashaw's
claim because it involves many of the procedural safeguards cus-
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 775, 804.
6 Although OHA is responsible for all Social Security hearings, this Article is con-
cerned only with disability hearings, which have constituted nearly 90% of the OHA
caseload. SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., RECENT STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS
CRISIS 3 (Comm. Print 1975).
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tomarily associated with due process, such as the rights to
adequate notice, representation, examination, and presentation of
evidence. Nonetheless, this Article will show that application of a
quality assurance system can enhance the accuracy of these ad-
judications.
THE DISABILITY ADJUDICATION PROCESS
Title II of the Social Security Act provides for the payment
of disability insurance benefits to persons meeting insured status
who are unable
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months ....
[A person shall be] determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work
but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experi-
ence, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy.... 7
The Secretary of HEW has promulgated criteria to assist in
making disability determinations. According to the regulations, a
person is disabled if, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
he suffers from one of many listed impairments or their equiva-
lents. 8 Even if a person's condition is not included in the listed
impairments or their medical equivalents, he can still qualify for
disability benefits if his condition in fact prevents him from en-
gaging in any substantial gainful activity. 9 To determine whether
an applicant satisfies this last criterion, the regulations require
consideration of factors including the person's age, education, and
work experience. 10
This last type of determination, often referred to as the re-
sidual functional capacity criterion, has probably caused the most
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(2) (1976).
8 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502-1504 Subpart P, App. I (1979).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (b) (1979).
10 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502 (b), 404.1504 (b) , (c) (1979). Additionally, § 404.1502(c) al-
lows a finding of disability in certain cases where vocational factors are extremely severe.
1980]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:801
problems and variations in disability adjudications. Decisionmak-
ers can, to a large degree, use objective criteria to determine
whether a person's disability meets or equals the medical listings.
The decisionmaker must exercise considerably greater judgment,
however, when ruling whether a person whose disability is less
severe than the listings still has sufficient residual functional
capacity, considering his age, education, and work experience, to
allow him to perform a job. This decision requires an elaborate
balancing of the severity of the individual's disability with his edu-
cational and vocational abilities. These subjective determinations
comprise a significant portion of the disability caseload; for
example, 23.9% of all disability claims initially allowed in fiscal
1977 were based on the residual functional criterion."1 With
each successive stage of appeal, a higher percentage of claims in-
volves the residual functional criterion. Only about half of all dis-
ability claims are eventually decided on the basis of the medical
listings or equivalency criteria. 12
HEW, in an attempt to standardize disability determinations involving a mixture of
medical and vocational factors, developed new medical-vocational regulations, commonly
referred to as the "vocational grid." See 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, App. 2 (1979). This grid
directs a conclusion concerning the applicant's disability according to the findings of fact as
to a claimant's age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. For
example, the grid directs a determination that a claimant who is limited to sedentary
work by his residual functional capacity is disabled when he is age 55 or older, possesses a
limited education, and is unskilled. Yet the grid also specifies that a similar individual age
45-49 is not disabled.
The authors are unaware of the grid's success as measured by quality assurance data
because the data on which this Article is based were collected before HEW implemented
the grid. The grid's ability to reduce ambiguity in disability determinations, however, is
limited by its inability to direct a finding of nondisability where mental factors exist, and
the presence of such factors is common. Also, use of the grid still requires an administra-
tive law judge's (ALJ) finding of fact on each factor used to calculate the grid requirements
and thus can increase uniformity only if the variation in ALJ decisions arises from the
combining of factual findings rather than the findings of fact themselves. Although quality
assurance errors have not been broken into categories permitting estimation of the percen-
tage of errors that result from the findings of fact rather than from the combining of the
findings, major error areas such as insufficient medical evidence and failure to resolve
issues of pain would not be reduced because of the grid.
l" SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG.,
2D SESs., DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE 29-31, Table III (Comm. Print 1978) [here-
inafter cited as DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE].
Of the remaining initial allowances, 34.2% were based on a finding that the disability
met the medical listings and 41.9% on a finding that the disability was equivalent to the
medical listings. Id.




The disability program's adjudicatory ladder is unique
among Social Security insurance-based programs: it employs a
federal-state arrangement for the adjudication of its claims. The
Social Security Administration, through its federal district offices,
takes claims for disability insurance benefits and sends them to
state agencids, which develop medical and other evidence of disa-
bility and make determinations of disability.1 3 These determina-
tions are then sent to the SSA headquarters (the Office of Disabil-
ity Operations) where the state determinations are issued as federal
decisions. '4 Claimants for disability benefits who disagree with
these initial determinations have the right to have their claims re-
considered. Reconsideration procedures follow the same route as
initial claims-the SSA district offices receive the requests, the
state agency develops the evidence and reconsiders its determina-
tions, and the SSA normally adopts the state determinations.1 5
Although the SSA has the power to reduce state agency awards to
claimants1 6 or return a case to the appropriate state agency for
review, it has no authority to issue a determination more favora-
ble than the state agency's. In practice, however, neither of the
permitted actions is common.
State agency participation in the process ceases at the third
adjudicative level. A claimant still dissatisfied with a reconsidera-
tion determination may request a formal hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ) in the OHA.17 Requests for hearings
are again taken at SSA district offices, but these recjuests are then
forwarded to one of roughly 140 SSA hearing offices located
across the nation and operated by the OHA. Requests for hear-
ings are assigned to individual ALJ's who are then responsible for
perfecting the evidentiary record, holding face-to-face nonadver-
sary hearings (unless a claimant waives the right to personal ap-
pearance), and issuing final decisions.1 8  ALJ's can request the
13 See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SURVEY OF STATE DISABILITY AGENCIES UNDER SOCIAL SE-
CURITY AND SSI PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1975).
,4 See 42 U.S.C § 421(a), (c) (1976); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a), 404.1521 (1979). See
generally DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 4. See also H.R. REP. No.
100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 8-10, 25-26 (1979).
"5 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909, 404.910 (1979).
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 4 21(c) (1976); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1979).
I7 See 42 U.S.C. § 421(d) (1976); 20 C.F.R. § 404.917 (1979).
,' See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.922a-404.939 (1979).
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appearance of medical and vocational experts at the hearing and
can require claimants to undergo consultative examinations.
Claimants can elect to be represented by legal counsel or by lay
persons, but the hearing remains nonadversarial whether or not
claimants are represented.
A claimant dissatisfied with the decision at the hearing level
may, within sixty days, request the Appeals Council to review his
claim.1 9  The Council, a body of attorneys that sits in the Office
of Hearings and Appeals headquarters in Washington, D.C., can
refuse to review an ALJ decision.2° The Appeals Council review
mechanism is a claimant's last administrative recourse; further
appeal must be made through the federal district courts .21
Of particular significance in this adjudicatory scheme is the
lack of control exercised by the SSA over administration and de-
cisionmaking. Although the federal government funds all benefits
and state administrative costs, state law controls many administra-
tive aspects of the program and the SSA routinely accepts state
determinations on claims. With state agencies making most disabil-
ity determinations and ALJ's-whose independence is assured by
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 22-making most other
decisions, federal control over administration, decisionmaking,
and costs is difficult to maintain. Critics of the disability program
point to these procedural arrangements, along with the vagueness
of the disability definition, as the main problems of the system.23
9 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.945, 404.946 (1979). For a general description of the hearing
and appeal process, see SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND
ISSUE PAPER (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as ALJ SURVEY]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., DISABILITY
INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER (Comm. Print 1976); J MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F.
GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, R. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND AP-
PEALS (1978) [hereinafter cited as HEARINGS AND APPEALS].
20 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.947 (1979). The Appeals Council can also reopen a case on its
own motion within sixty days after notice of the ALJ's decision.
21 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4 05(g), 421(d) (1976).
22 See generally ALJ SURVEY, supra note 19, at 12-21; text accompanying notes 32-33,
infra.
23 See, e.g., ALJ SURVEY, supra note 19, at 14-15. The Disability Insurance Amendments
of 1979, H.R. 3236, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. contain provisions intended to alleviate some of
these problems. The bill strengthens the federal role in the disability adjudication process
by giving the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare the authority to establish proce-
dures and performance standards for state disability determinations. States unwilling or
unable to comply with the standards would relinquish direct administration to the federal
government.
The bill would also require the SSA to review 65% of all state agency allowances
before implementation of the determinations and payment of benefits. This review would
[Vol. 65:801
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Both the division of decisionmaking responsibility and the
subjective nature of many disability determinations contribute to
large interstate variations in claim approval rates, frequency of
error rates, processing times, and case processing costs. For fiscal
year 1977, state agency denial rates ranged from 40.2% to
66.7%.24 State error rates, based on a sample review for the
period May to October, 1977, ranged from 6% to 27.7%. 25 Proc-
essing times varied widely, and state agency productivity ranged
from 156 to 310 cases processed per employee.26 Similar varia-
tions exist in ALJ approval rates: some ALJ's awarded benefits in
only about 10% of their cases while others awarded benefits in
almost 90% of their cases.27
In the mid-1970's a crisis arose in the disability program. In
addition to the variations among state agencies and ALJ's, the
number of initial claims and the number and proportion of cases
appealed up the administrative ladder and taken eventually to the
federal courts dramatically increased. In 1968, 317,400 (47.7%) of
the 638,900 disability claims brought were allowed on initial de-
termination. Over 67,000 claimants (21.0% of all claims initially
denied) sought reconsideration and almost 35% of these claims
were allowed upon reconsideration. Approximately 20,200 claim-
ants (45.9% of all reconsiderations lost) requested a hearing and
ALJ's or the Appeals Council allowed claims in about 42% of
these. That same year, 916 claims (3.8% of all hearings lost) were
taken to court and 313 of these were eventually allowed. 28  By
fiscal year 1977 both the number of claims and the percentage
allowed at each level had changed drastically. The number of
claims brought exceeded 1,250,000, but only 38.4% were allowed
initially. Almost 220,000 disappointed claimants (28.4% of all
claims initially denied) sought reconsideration and only 27.7% of
these were allowed on reconsideration. Over 92,000 claimants
(58.0% of all reconsiderations lost) sought a hearing and 48% of
these claims were allowed by ALJ's and the Appeals Council.
Finally, claimants filed almost 5,900 court actions (12.1% of all
be phased in with a 15% review in 1980 and the full 65% review by 1982. The bill was
passed by the House of Representatives on September 6, 1979. See H.R. REP. No. 100,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 8-10, 25-26 (1979).
24 DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 28, Table II.
'5 Id. at 42-43, Table XI.
26 Id. at 41, Table X.
27 HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 19, at 21 & Fig. 1-2, 42-43.
28 DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 24-27, Table I.
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hearings lost) and were successful in about 22% of the cases de-
cided.29 The percentage of claims allowed at the initial determi-
nation compared with the total number of claims ultimately al-
lowed fell from 90.9% to 81.9% over a decade. 30
This combination of trends-the huge increase in the
number of disability claims filed, the decreasing percentage of
claims allowed by the state agencies at the initial and reconsidera-
tion levels, the increase in claims allowed at the hearing and
appeal levels, the continuing diversity in state procedures, and
increased error rates-raised serious questions concerning the effi-
ciency and efficacy of the system. These problems were particu-
larly evident at the hearing level, where ALJ's allowed a high per-
centage of claims twice-denied by state agencies, deciding many of
these claims under the subjective residual functional capacity
criterion. Exacerbating matters, the rapid increase in requests for
hearings had caused delays, frequently up to a year, 31 in the
processing of cases at the hearing and appeal levels.
II
THE OHA SETTING
OHA implemented its quality assurance system in the context
of increased workload pressure, aroused skepticism, and stricter
scrutiny. The particular circumstances of OHA adjudication dic-
tated in large measure the form of its quality assurance system
and the issues that arose regarding its applicability.
One of the most important aspects of OHA adjudication is
the independence of the ALJ's under the APA. The purpose of
this independence is to guarantee claimants the right to an inde-
pendent de novo decision, neither biased by prior agency determi-
nations nor affected by agency pressures on the decisionmaker.
Various procedures exist to protect ALJ's from agency interfer-
ence. For example, ALJ's are hired by the Office of Personnel
Management, not by the particular agency, and are not subject to
annual agency evaluation as are other Civil Service employees.
In addition to limitations in the employment relationship be-
tween the agency and ALJ's, procedural safeguards preserve the
independence of ALJ's. Prior to an ALJ's decision on a claim, for
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See ALJ SuRvEY, supra note 19, at 21.
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example, ex parte contact between the ALJ and the agency on the
substance of the claim is proscribed.
The independence guaranteed ALJ's by the APA does not
bar the agency from monitoring various aspects of the perform-
ance of an ALJ. 32 The freedom from agency interference refers
to decisional interference only and is designed to protect the
claimant, not the ALJ's. Nonetheless, a large number of OHA
ALJ's had a much broader view of their independence under the
APA; they objected vehemently to OHA monitoring or controlling
any aspect of their performance, including management of staff
resources. OHA, meanwhile, recognized its dependence on the
good will of ALJ's to hear the cases and reduce the pressing
backlog. In short, OHA walked on eggs as it instituted the quality
assurance system. Even though it could, have legally exerted
greater control and more closely monitored ALJ processing of
claims, OHA designed the quality assurance system to avoid, as
much as possible, directly assaulting the view of the ALJ's of their
independence. 33
In addition, since quality assurance was a new system im-
posed on existing agency processes, OHA tailored it to meld with
the ALJ hearing process. In order to evaluate the OHA quality
review system, it is therefore necessary to describe normal OHA
and SSA processing procedures for ALJ hearing decisions.
When an ALJ makes an unfavorable determination on a
claim, the decision is sent to the claimant, and the claims file (the
evidentiary and procedural record) is forwarded to the OHA
central office; the file remains available in the event a claimant
requests review by the Appeals Council. If a favorable decision is
issued, however, the file is sent to the Office of Disability Opera-
tions of SSA for payment of any past-due benefits, preparation
3 For an excellent discussion, including the opinions of several legal scholars, on the
application of the Administrative Procedure Act to Social Security cases and the indepen-
dence issue, see ALJ SURVEY, supra note 19, at 6-11.
33 ALJ independence has been an issue in a number of recent civil suits brought by
ALJ's and claimants against the SSA. One such suit, Bono v. Califano, No. 77-0819-CU-
W-4 (W.D. Mo., settled June 7, 1979), was settled. Although the provisions of the settle-
ment affirm the authority of the SSA and OHA to exercise administrative and manage-
ment functions over their corps of ALJ's, it does not appear to deal with possible future
improvements in the quality review system. In addition, the settlement jeopardizes the
feedback potential of Appeals Council review by providing that cases remanded by the
Council will be assigned to an ALJ different from the one who originally decided the case.
For a discussion of the issues in the Bono case and related suits, see ALJ SURVEY, supra note
19, at 112-13 (App.J).
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for regular computer payment of future benefits, and various
other less important processes, all of which typically require about
three months to complete. The significant aspect of this proce-
dure is that the claims file is unavailable to OHA while it is being
processed for payment. Thus, if the Appeals Council wishes to
review afavorable ALJ decision, it must review it either before the
payment process begins or else wait three months until the Office
of Disability Operations has completed all payment actions.
34
When, within the sixty day time period for appeal, a claimant
requests that an unfavorable ALJ decision be reviewed by the
Council, the case file is available and the review can be conducted
immediately. The Council's support staff-over 200 hearings and
appeals analysts -initially reviews the file. This staff is necessary
because of the large volume of appeals; it would be impossible for
the Council members to review personally over 4,000 appeals per
month (roughly 285 appeals per Council member) and also meet
the additional workload generated by further appeals to the dis-
trict courts.35 The analysts are highly trained in the relevant as-
pects of Social Security programs and are assigned to the work of
only one or two Council members. The analysts do not technically
make the decisions for the Council, but instead recommend that
the Council either deny or grant review. These pre-existing case
processing procedures significantly influenced the design of the
quality assurance adopted by OHA.
III
QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS
Mashaw asserts that "a quality control system can be adapted
to virtually any type of enterprise or end product for it involves
merely the development of standards, the evaluation of perform-
ance against those standards, and action to upgrade substandard
performance." 36  The first step, the development of standards,
essentially involves the formulation of an error definition which
can be applied with some precision to divide the "end products"
34 See text accompanying note 42 infra.
35 The Appeals Council processed 52,273 requests for review in 1977, or almost 4,400
a month. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, BHA
FACT SHEET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, BHA PuB. No. 039 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BHA
FACT SHEET]. The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA) is now the Office of Hearing
and Appeals (OHA).
36 Mashaw, supra note 1, at 791.
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into defective and nondefective categories. Evaluation of
performance against those standards, the second stage, requires
the establishment of various procedures for applying the error
definition and detecting any errors. The final step, action to up-
grade substandard performance, includes both correction of er-
rors discovered by the error detection process and analysis of in-
formation acquired through that process so that management can
prevent future errors. This Article will discuss these three stages
in sequence. As the discussion will show, however, these three
components are interwoven and cannot be treated entirely sepa-
rately.
A. Error Definition
The OHA quality assurance system defined an error as any
defect so serious that it either required corrective action by the
Appeals Council, or would have required such action had the
claimant requested Council review within the sixty-day limit. 37
This definition is significant for two reasons. First, it mandates
that only "sufficiently serious" defects are errors. Second, it envi-
sions that a subsequent operational level, the Appeals Council, will
apply this standard to define errors made at the lower hearing
level.
1. Sufficiently Serious
The main reason for restricting the error definition to seri-
ous defects was to focus the system on the most egregious prob-
lems. The sheer magnitude of the disability hearing process and
the time pressures under which ALJ's work commonly cause
minor deviations from the theoretical norm. Another reason for
limiting the error definition to serious inadequacies is that, given
the subjectivity of disability determinations and the negative at-
titude of many ALJ's towards the quality assurance undertaking, it
appeared that the system would be better received and have
greater credibility if it identified only serious and relatively clear-
cut defects. 38
" See note 19 and accompanying text supra.




The judgmental nature of ALJ decisions and OHA's concern
with credibility were also the reasons behind the adoption of an
operational standard to define error. The subjectivity inherent in
disability adjudication stands in sharp contrast to the factors which
shape quality assurance systems in the industrial context. For
example, a factory that produces sheets of glass can test the ten-
sile strength of the glass by applying a given longitudinal stress to
a random sample of glass; it either breaks or it does not. In this
setting, quality assurance standards are well-defined. Disability
criteria, on the other hand, are not so easily defined, especially
where the medical listings or equivalents do not apply. 39 Al-
though subjectivity pervades the entire disability determination
process, it is typically most troublesome in borderline cases, which
most often reach OHA.
These considerations suggest that the question of what con-
stitutes an error is not so much the issue of what abstract defini-
tion to apply, but rather the problem of who shall apply whatever
definition is adopted. The ability of a quality control system to
measure performance authoritatively depends ultimately on the
legitimacy of the body that determines which defects shall count
as errors. Within OHA, only the Appeals Council has the author-
ity to label an ALJ's decision an error. Consequently, the opera-
tional practice of the Appeals Council was adopted as the stan-
dard for evaluating ALJ performance.
The use of the Appeals Council's operational standard to de-
fine and detect errors in the handling of claims by ALJ's created
some troubles. One major problem resulted from the substantial
evidence rule, 40 which states that the Appeals Council will not dis-
turb an ALJ's decision that is based on substantial evidence. This
rule demands more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance
of evidence. 41  While an ALJ's decision is incorrect if not sup-
ported by a preponderance of the evidence, under the operational
definition of error that decision is not an error unless it also fails
to meet the substantial evidence test. Although this reduces the
'9 See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
40 20 C.F.R. § 404.947a(a)(3) (1979).
41 In Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966), the Court defined
substantial evidence as "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility
of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administra-
tive agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 620.
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scope of the quality control system, it only eliminates marginal
errors, automatically focusing attention on the more serious de-
fects.
The operational standard also raises questions of uniformity
in its application. For example, when the workload is heavy, the
Appeals Council may tend to construe substantial evidence liber-
ally and affirm an ALJ's decision which is supported by less evi-
dence than the Council would require during slack periods when
it had ample time to scrutinize each case. If such shifts occur,
then error rates would change artificially.
B. Error Detection
The hearings and appeals analysts on the Appeals Council
staff actually perform the quality assurance case review. A ran-
dom sample of approximately five percent of all ALJ decisions is
computer-selected roughly fifteen days after the close of the sam-
ple month. If the claimant has appealed the decision, the Council
conducts the quality assurance analysis as part of the required re-
view. Unappealed sample denial cases are typically reviewed by
the analysts after the sixty-day period for filing an appeal has
passed. The analysts review the claims files for the sample and
complete a form noting claimant's age, education, and work ex-
perience, and information concerning the processing of the claim,
including the date of the hearing, a summary of any expert tes-
timony, and an evaluation of any defects, serious or nonserious,
that are present. If the analyst detects a serious error, he forwards
the claims folder and completed form to the Appeals Council for
concurrence. The case is deemed an error for quality review pur-
poses only if the Council member agrees that a serious defect
exists. The Appeals Council never reviews unappealed cases that
the analyst decides are error-free. Following the review process,
quality review forms are sent to the Division of Appraisal-which
is responsible for the overall administration of OHA's quality as-
surance system-for compilation and analysis.
Quality assurance review of allowance decisions follows a
similar path but only after payment and other effectuation actions
have been completed. 42  One upshot of adopting a post-
effectuation review system for ALJ allowances is that the sixty-day
42 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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period during which the Appeals Council may correct an er-
roneous decision on its own motion has run before the Council
reviews these cases. 43 Consequently, the Council and the analysts
may treat the allowance decision less seriously. The extent to
which this inability to correct wrong decisions affects the analysts'
motivation is a matter of conjecture. To the extent that it creates
an attitude of futility, the analysts are likely to report fewer er-
rors, especially since the operational definition of error offers
considerable leeway. This would systematically understate the
error rate.4 4
C. Error Correction
1. Individual Sample Case Error Correction
Error correction is the key step in the quality assurance sys-
tem. It should focus not only on correcting errors detected as part
of the review process, but also on systematically determining and
remedying the causes of errors. Both individual case correction
and systematic process correction come within Mashaw's "action to
upgrade substandard performance. 45  The proper mix of these
error-correction devices depends on the complexity of the process
to be reviewed, the amount of time and resources needed for
each review, and the level of control the reviewer can directly
exercise on the end products. For example, in a manufacturing
context, the quality assurance system might consist of an end-of-
production-line inspector who tests every manufactured part to
determine if it meets the buyer's specifications. Those parts that
fail the quality test are discarded. If several rejects are traced to
one machine, action will be taken to repair it. The inspector tests
each part using clear and objective criteria. He can make rapid
decisions without significantly slowing final acceptance of the
goods and he can inspect the work of many machines in a rela-
tively short time.
This example posits an inspection system so short, simple,
and inexpensive that every product can be examined, all deficient
articles rejected, and action easily taken to correct processing de-
13 See note 20 supra. The Appeals Council can reopen a case within four years after the
date of the notice of the initial determination where there is an error "on the face of the
evidence." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957(b), 404.958(c) (1979).
44 See text accompanying note 56 infra.
45 Mashaw, supra note 1, at 791.
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fects. As the production process becomes more complex or the
decision of right or wrong becomes more judgmental, however,
the costs of inspecting every final product will increase and the
accuracy of the review will probably decrease. Cost-effectiveness is
not the only consideration. In OHA, for example, 100% review
might be cost-effective given the high average benefit award.
46
But pressure for timeliness in a time-consuming process, limited
manpower resources, and the political costs of hiring a staff large
enough to review every case may mandate a highly selective re-
view process in which systematic error correction predominates
over individual case correction.
The structure of the OHA quality assurance system reflects
these considerations. The hearings and appeals analysts-review a
random sample of only about five percent of all cases, and there-
fore a maximum of only five percent of all errors can be cor-
rected in conjunction with the review process. In addition, only
the appealed denials, which constitute about one-quarter of the
sample cases, 47 are subjected to quality assurance review within
the sixty-day limit for Council corrective action, reducing the
possibilities for individual case correction even further. As alterna-
tives to individual sample case error correction, OHA has attemp-
ted to influence ALJ's by returning their erroneous cases, report-
ing errors and dispensing instructional materials.
2. Feedback and Instruction
OHA has at times incorporated a remand procedure for er-
roneously decided ALJ decisions. The predominant practice of
the Appeals Council, however, has been to make any necessary
corrections itself, unless a new hearing is required. In any event, a
46 The House Ways and Means Committee, recognizing cost-effectiveness potentials,
approved a provision in H.R. 3236, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), mandating federal review
of 65% of all state agency allowance decisions by 1982. According to Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) cost estimates, the 65% review will result in a net savings. CBO based its
estimate on a six month test review of 6,299 initial disability allowances where 23.6% of the
allowances were returned to the states and' 22.1% were subsequently denied. From these
percentages of those returned CBO projected the total number of erroneous allowances
that would be denied with the 65% review and concluded that the provision would save
$99 million in 1982. H.R. REP. No. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1979). The Report does
not discuss what went into the decision to limit the review to 65% and no figures are
supplied to suggest that 65% is the most cost-effective level of review.
7 In 1977, ALJ's processed 186,822 cases and claimants appealed 47,719 of these, or
25.5%, to the Appeals Council. Since the sample is a simple random one, about 25% of all
sample cases are appealed denials. See BHA FAcT SHEET, supra note 35, at 2-3.
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remand procedure would have been a mixed blessing in the OHA
setting.
First, the Council could potentially remand only the sample
cases appealed to it or appealed denials, which constitute only
one-quarter of all sample cases. 48 Second, feedback of errors
should have instructional value and discourage repetition of past
mistakes. But OHA remanding of a slew of cases for correction
might meet with a storm of protest from a corps of quasi-
independent ALJ's on the ground that judgmental findings
rather than errors are involved. This in turn might create an op-
erational tendency to return only the most grievous errors. Third,
in remanding a case the Appeals Council does not demand that
the ALJ.reverse his decision. The remand simply contains specific
instructions concerning the development of evidence. Under these
* circumstances, the remand might force a claimant to come before
an unusually harsh.ALJ a second time. Finally, since the Council
could only remand erroneous appealed denials, ALJ's might tend
to allow close cases rather than risk a remand. The focus of Ap-
peals Council review on appealed denials instead of allowances al-
ready skews the system in this direction to some extent.
3. Error Analysis and Instruction
An alternative to feedback by remand devised by OHA is a
program for isolating specific causes of error and then instructing
the ALJ's to remedy these causes. OHA collects data on all facets
of case processing, including considerable amounts of medical, vo-
cational, and demographic data, for each kind of decision-
allowance, appealed denial, and unappealed denial. From this in-
formation, OHA prepares quarterly quality assurance reports.
Each report contains a statistical summary of national and re-
gional error-rate data on time-line graphs, a breakdown of errors
by type and stage of process, analytic summaries of high fre-
quency problem areas, and recommendations for improvement.
In addition, each report focuses on a different adjudicative factor,
disability category, or case type, discussing its possible relation-
ship to error-proneness. These quarterly quality review reports
are distributed to top management and to the supervisory judge
corps, both in the central office and the regions. OHA also sends
instructional material on specific error areas to all ALJ's. The Ap-
48 See note 47 supra.
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peals Council also addresses such topics in regular written reports
and face-to-face instructional sessions with hearing offices.
Instructional bulletins and special training can be effective
whe're errors reflect deficiencies in knowledge, but they only
suggest rather than demand change. Furthermore, because such
efforts are not immediately connected with the correction of a
particular error in a particular case, management and ad-
judicators consider them less important. The authors believe that
as long as the backlog of claims remained high, only limited effort
was put into detailed instruction, particularly where the instruc-
tion emphasized case processing requirements that lengthened
the hearing process.
The statistics also indicate that the instructional and report-
ing programs had no significant effect on the accuracy of the
hearing process. In spite of these programs, error rates fluctuated
as much as fifty percent from one quarter to the next. 49 Errors
based on insufficient medical or vocational evidence, an area of
major instructional concentration, also varied markedly with no
trend towards improvement. 50
D. Error-Prone Analysis and Appeals Council Review of Error-Prone
Cases
There is no hard evidence that the OHA quality assurance
system has thus far enhanced due process for disability claimants
by increasing the accuracy of the hearing process. What then is
left of Mashaw's claim that quality control can work? Data derived
from the OHA quality assurance system strongly suggest that a
third variety of error correction could, if used, improve the accu-
racy of the disability determination process.
Quality assurance error analyses indicate that certain cate-
gories of cases are more error-prone than others. These analy-
ses isolate characteristics that make the work of ALJ's error-prone,
and processing practices that contribute to error. Once these character-
49 Appraisal Staff, Division of Administration, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, Social
Security Administration, Report on Quality Review 8-10, April-June 1977 (on file at the
Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Quality Review April-June 1977].
50 Evidentiary errors were found in 51% of all cases in the third quarter of 1976, 42%
in the next quarter, 32% in the next, and 44% in the second quarter of 1977. See Appraisal
Staff, Division of Administration, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security
Administration, Report on Quality Review, January-March 1977, April-June 1977, July-
September 1977 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
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istics are identified, the Appeals Council can, on its own motion,5'
scrutinize and correct errors in those cases having such charac-
teristics. This form of error correction has several advantages,
particularly in a setting like OHA. Foremost, if sufficiently strong
error-indicators can be isolated, a relatively small amount of
scarce personnel resources could correct a significant number of
errors. Second, OHA could accomplish this without an additional
review authority.
OHA has made some error-prone analyses, although it has
not undertaken any concerted efforts to implement such a sys-
tem.52  When OHA established the quality review system, it col-
lected large amounts of data and subjected them to a variety of
error-prone analyses. The results of these analyses preliminarily
indicate the form the error-prone review should take.
For example, as mentioned earlier, the claim allowance rates
of individual ALJ's vary from ten to ninety percent.5 3  Simple
statistical tests reveal that the error rate for sample cases of ALJ's
with extremely high or extremely low allowance rates is higher
than for other cases. This is 1articularly true for the allowance
decisions of ALJ's with high allowance rates.5 4 This suggests that
in some instances the outcome of a claimant's case depends on the
luck of the draw rather than the merits of the claim. Appeals
Council review of such cases would enhance the fundamental
fairness of the system precisely where it has deteriorated.
The data suggest that appealed denials are more error-prone
than unappealed denials. Evidently claimants are able to discrimi-
nate between correct and incorrect disallowance decisions and
thus the error rate for unappealed denials is lower than the rate
for appealed denials. 55 The data may be misleading: the futility
3, See note 20 supra.
52 The Division of Appraisal prepared an issue paper outlining its findings on the use
of error-prone analysis. See Appraisal Staff, Division of Administration, Bureau of Hear-
ings and Appeals, Social Security Administration, Comprehensive Review of ALJ Rever-
sals, July 25, 1978 (internal OHA document) [hereinafter cited as Review of ALJ Rever-
sals]. OHA also has taken some preliminary steps toward implementation, including con-
sideration of modifying the OHA computerized management information system to aid in
the selection of error-prone cases and making a test run. As far as the authors know,
however, OHA has not acted further.
53 See note 27 and accompanying text, supra.
51 See HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 19, at 3-4.
55 OHA sampled appealed and unappealed denials and discovered that the error rate
for unappealed denials is between 10% and 25% of the rate for appealed denials. For
instance, the error rate during the second quarter of 1977 for appealed denials was 6.5%,




problem may artificially reduce the number of errors detected by
the analyst in unappealed denials since errors cannot be cor-
rected. 56 A validation study conducted one year after implemen-
tation of the quality assurance system discounted this possibility.
In that study, OHA's Division of Appraisal reviewed a subset of
quality assurance sample cases. The review was conducted without
access to the original quality review form. Where the Division de-
tected an error not previously reported, it forwarded the case to
the Appeals Council for concurrence. The study revealed that the
analysts left no more errors undetected in unappealed denials
than in appealed denials.5" Thus, the futility problem does not
undercut the claimant appeal as a factor in identifying error-
prone cases.
The data suggest that allowances also are more error-prone
than unappealed denials. 58  Furthermore, the validation study
indicated that the OHA quality contriol system understates error-
rates for allowances more than for denials.5 9 Thus, since all ap-
pealed denials are already reviewed by the Appeals Council, the
study shows that allowances rather than unappealed denials would
be a more profitable area for error-prone review.
Cases containing many error-prone factors can be detected
by discriminant analysis, a statistical tool which can categorize a
sample of cases into two or more groups based on statistical prop-'
erties. 60 OHA conducted a trial discriminant analysis study on
hearing decisions in 1978. It derived a discriminate function that
assigned numerical values to characteristics in accordance with their
correlation to error-proneness. A case's error-proneness was rep-
resented by a score equal to the sum of its weighted values for
5' See text accompanying note 44 supra (post-effectuation review creates futility prob-
lem because Appeals Council can no longer correct erroneous decision).
57 Appraisal Staff, Division of Administration, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, Social
Security Administration, Report on Quality Review Form Validation Study, November 1,
1977 (internal OHA document) [hereinafter cited as Validation Study]. The study, com-
pleted in October 1977, reviewed 73 unappealed and 72 appealed denials. It uncovered
two additional errors in each category. See id. at 2.
1 58 For example, during the second quarter of 1977, the error rate for allowances was
6.5% and the rate for unappealed denials was 1.6%. See Quality Review April-June 1977,
supra note 49, at 8-10.
59 In the validation study, allowances contained an additional 4.7% of errors whereas
unappealed denials contained an additional 2.8%. See Validation Study, supra note- 57, at 4.
60 For a full description of discriminant analysis see N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K.
STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 434-67 (2d ed.
1975).
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each relevant characteristic. The study concluded that sufficiently
strong predictors of errors can be identified so that, for example,
a group containing ten percent of the most error-prone ALJ allow-
ances as selected by discriminant analysis would yield about forty
percent of all ALJ allowance errors.61
These test results indicate that discriminant analysis could
significantly improve the accuracy of the hearing process at a rela-
tively low cost.62 Discriminant analysis would rank new allowance
cases according to their error-prone scores. The Appeals Council
could then choose either to scrutinize all allowance cases exceed-
ing a certain error-prone score or to review a set number of the
most error-prone allowance cases. 63  For individual case correc-
tion, the review must occur before effectuation, since the Council
has only sixty days to correct errors on its own motion.64
" See Review of ALJ Reversals, supra note 52. The report also included a cost-benefit
estimate that the 10% error-prone case review would increase costs about $.8 million but
could save as much as $24 million. See -id. at 3.
When the Division of Appraisal proposed that OHA use error-prone review to reduce
errors, the concept and the techniques for such procedures were largely untried in social
welfare settings. Error-prone analysis has now become a common and successful error re-
duction device in the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemen-
tary Security Income (SSI) programs, both of which are under the jurisdiction of the SSA.
The Office of Family Assistance, the SSA component that oversees the state operations of
the AFDC programs, recently invited state administrators to a three-day conference on
error-prone profiling. The conference took the form of "how to" seminars, with states
that had successfully implemented the system reporting on the techniques they used and
the relative advantages of different methodologies in different settings. West Virginia,
which has the longest running system, reported that its error-prone profiling reduced
payment error-rates from 7% to 5% in six years. South Carolina reduced its payment
error-rate from 7.8% to 7.1% in less than one year. The District of Columbia instituted
error-prone review at the General Accounting Office's mandate and selected a 20% sample
of cases for review that had twice the error-rate of a randomly selected sample. In a dem-
onstration project in New Hampshire involving a portion of the Medicaid workload the
profiles increased the error yield of the random sample by 250%. The SSI program also
reported that the use of profiling in some of its offices substantially reduced error-rates in
comparison with "control" offices. The redetermination error rate for the first nine months
of 1978 for offices using profiling procedures was 1.7%, while in the offices using standard
procedures it was 3.0%. See U.S. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, CONFERENCE ON THE UTILI-
ZATION OF CHARACTERISTIC PROFILES AS A WORKLOAD PLANNING TECHNIQUE (1979).
62 Since the review process is not static, continued random sampling to determine
error-prone characteristics would be needed to ensure the accuracy of the discriminant
analysis.
63 The marginal productivity of error-prone review decreases as the sample increases.
Nevertheless, error-prone review would always uncover more errors than would a random
sampling of the same number of cases.
64 See text accompanying notes 20, 34, & 42, supra. The ranking procedures would
delay the effectuation of allowance cases. The delay need not be excessive if the ranking
only uses precise, easily-identifiable error-prone characteristics. Personnel in the office
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Use of discriminant analysis would permit the Appeals Coun-
cil to detect errors more efficiently and to correct these errors by
individual case correction. Process correction efforts could still
continue but they would no longer be the primary tool of error
correction. With discriminant analysis, the Council could addition-
ally review the most error-prone cases within the most error-
prone class of cases-allowances. Appealed denials, the other class
of error-prone cases, are already reviewed, and unappealed de-
nials, which are relatively error-free, would not be reviewed. Such
an efficient use of Council resources could potentially correct
thirty to forty percent of all errors, 65 significantly increasing the
accuracy of the disability hearing system.66
CONCLUSION
Data derived from the OHA experience support Mashaw's
claim that quality assurance can be applied to the social welfare
adjudication process, even where the decisions involved are highly
judgmental. Although the nature of the disability hearing process
limits the capability of any review process to correct all errors,
quality assurance can correct a significant number of defects.
Another limitation is the unreliability of error rates measured on
a temporal dimension; rate changes may result from changes in
what is measured-ALJ behavior-or changes in the measuring
instrument-the Appeals Council. Nonetheless, these limitations
point to the necessity of careful use of the data derived from
OHA's quality assurance system, not to the futility of the system.
Even though there is no evidence that the quality assurance sys-
tem has improved the "fundamental fairness" of the disability
hearing process, data derived from the system suggest that use of
discriminant analysis could do so.
This conclusion is paradoxical in light of Mashaw's original
goal. Mashaw envisioned quality control as a management tool to
where all allowance files are sent for effectuation could perform the task. Effectuation of
the highly error-prone allowance cases selected for quality assurance review would of
course be delayed further pending that review, but not beyond the 60-day limit.
6' See Validation Study, supra note 57, at 2.
" Use of discriminant analysis would increase the number of review cases because the
current 5% random sampling would still be necessary to update the error-prone charac-
teristics upon which the analysis relies. The review of the error-prone cases would be in
addition to the number of cases currently reviewed. However, the savings from the error
detection yield from discriminant analysis more than justifies this added cost. See Review of
ALJ Reversals, supra note 52.
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ensure due process so that a claimant could obtain the benefits to
which he is entitled. This Article suggests, however, that the
primary target for error correction should be allowance cases, en-
titling fewer rather than more claimants to benefits. Although this
may be the immediate effect, in the long run elimination of er-
roneous allowances could aid those entitled to benefits by reduc-
ing pressure to cut disability payment rates or coverage. 17
67 H.R. 3236, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), in addition to the provisions for greater
federal control over disability claims, would also limit maximum disability benefits and
change the mix of disability benefits away from younger disabled workers. See H.R. REP.
No. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1979).
